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INTRODUCTION 
The subject of modern piracy has now become well-known and 
involves an age-old crime—kidnap for ransom.  According to an 
annual piracy report issued by the Piracy Reporting Centre of the 
International Chamber of Commerce’s International Maritime 
Bureau, a total of 406 incidents of piracy and armed robbery were 
reported in 2009, with 153 vessels boarded, 49 vessels hijacked, 84 
attempted attacks, and 120 vessels fired upon.1  Shipowners have used 
industry Best Management Practices—e.g., training of crew, 
implementation of the Ship Security Reporting System,2 use of 
military escort and crisis management services—to thwart pirate 
attacks.3  Nevertheless, in the event of a successful hijacking, payment 
of ransom is nearly always the only way to save the lives of crew and 
free the ship.4 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Maersk Alabama 
Perhaps the only exception to this rule is the outcome of the pirate 
hijacking of the 1098-TEU U.S. flagged Maersk Alabama on April 8, 
2009.5  The crew initially fought off the attack, but the pirates fled 
with the captain as a hostage.  U.S. naval forces then killed three of 
the pirate kidnappers, arrested one, and saved the captain, all 
without American casualty.6  Despite the success of the Maersk 
                                                          
 1. ICC Commercial Crime Services, 2009 Worldwide Piracy Figures Surpass 400, 
Jan. 14, 2010,  
http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=385:2009-
worldwide-piracy-figures-surpass-400&catid=60:news&Itemid=51  
[hereinafter Piracy Figures]. 
 2. See Tackling the Costs of Piracy, 368 FAIRPLAY 18, 18 (2010). 
 3. For a further explanation on Best Management Practices see Practical 
Measures to Combat Pirates, 367 FAIRPLAY 14, 14 (2009).  Self-help deterrents available 
to seafarers include using barbed wire, empty forty-five gallon drums, wood, and/or 
netting to cut off access to primary areas or to the vessel’s deck.  Id. 
 4. Cf. Samantha Kenny, Comment, Regional Shortcomings and Global Solutions:  
Kidnap, Ransom and Insurance in Latin America, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 557, 577–81 (2008) 
(arguing that payment of ransom greatly increases the likelihood of a safe return for 
kidnap victims in South America). 
 5. See 2009 Review Month by Month, TRADE WINDS, Dec. 18, 2009, at 37, available at 
http://www.tradewinds.no/weekly/w2009-12-18/article550163.ece?service-
printArticle; see also Mark Mazzetti & Sharon Otterman, U.S. Captain Is Hostage Of 
Pirates, Navy Ship Arrives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/09/world/africa/09pirates.html  
(detailing further accounts of the Maersk Alabama’s encounter with pirates). 
 6. In fact, Captain Richard Phillips’ life rights have been acquired by Columbia 
Pictures Studio, which has also optioned the film rights to Phillips’ upcoming 
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Alabama rescue campaign, repeats of such a highly coordinated and 
risky maneuver will not be common. 
The jurisdiction of the U.S. Navy in the case of Maersk Alabama was 
clear.  The vessel was registered with the United States flag and 
employed a crew of American citizens.7  Given the international 
nature of the shipping industry, however, there are numerous other 
situations in which the jurisdiction of the United States to act could 
be muddled.  For example, a hijacked vessel may well be flagged, as 
many are, in one of the several nations that maintain ship registries, 
such as the Republic of the Marshall Islands or the Republic of 
Liberia.8  Or the vessel may be owned by a single-purpose corporation 
incorporated under the laws of Norway and organized as a subsidiary 
of a United States parent corporation organized under the laws of 
Delaware. 
The Authors of this Article faced a similar set of circumstances in 
November, 2008, with the hijacking of the Liberian-flagged Biscaglia.  
We assisted Industrial Shipping Enterprises Corp., a corporation 
organized and existing in the Republic of the Marshall Islands but 
based in Connecticut, in the company’s negotiations with pirates over 
the payment of ransom and the safe release of the company’s 
international crew and vessel.  These negotiations, to our surprise, 
were conducted in a somewhat business-like manner with the Somali 
pirates, and happily resulted in the safe release of the crew, the ship, 
and its cargo. 
In addition, since the Maersk Alabama hijacking, it has been 
suggested that aggressive responses to pirate attacks and hijackings 
will lead to an escalating risk of reprisal from the pirates.9  In fact, 
there appears to be a trend of increasing risk of violence associated 
with hijacking and ransoming of a vessel’s crew.10  In terms of the 
gross numbers during 2009, sixty-eight crew members were injured 
                                                          
memoir.  Tatiana Siegel, Columbia Hooks Pirate Tale, VARIETY, May 28, 2009, 
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118004256.html. 
 7. See 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (granting jurisdiction to federal courts over vessels 
belonging to the United States or its citizens, as well as any vessel registered under 
the laws of the United States). 
 8. See generally John T. Oliver, Legal and Policy Factors Governing the Imposition of 
Conditions on Access to and Jurisdiction Over Foreign-Flag Vessels in U.S. Ports, 5 S.C. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 210 (2009); Constantine G. Papavizas, U.S.-Flag Vessel Financing and 
Citizenship Requirements Update, 32 TUL. MAR. L.J. 35 (2007) (detailing international 
ship registries and U.S. jurisdiction concerns). 
 9. See, e.g., Corey Flintoff, Somali Pirates Threaten Revenge, NPR, Apr. 13, 2009, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103035759&ft=1&f=1001 
(discussing how Somali pirates will specifically target American ships and officials). 
 10. See Piracy Figures, supra note 1; see also John Drake, Violent Attacks on the Rise Off 
Africa, LLOYD’S LIST, Dec. 4, 2009, at 13 (describing the Somali pirates’ escalating use 
of violence and increasing aggression). 
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and eight were reported killed by pirates—much higher than 
previous years.11  In fact, after the Maersk Alabama hijacking, Somali 
pirates threatened to target U.S. vessels and crew in specific 
retaliation.12 
B. Response 
While the Maersk Alabama incident brought the modern face of 
piracy into the media spotlight, not all the effects of this publicity 
have been positive.  Up until the Maersk Alabama incident, virtually all 
hijackings in the Gulf of Aden had played out in a similar manner—
primitive business negotiations with the pirates eventually leading to 
a safe release.13  Other than coverage in the trade press, Somali piracy 
was not front page news.  The detentions followed a similar pattern:  
a hijacking occurred, the parties negotiated for release of the 
hostages for a forty-five to sixty-day time period, and an agreement 
was eventually reached on the amount of the ransom and the drop-
off mechanics.14  In most cases, there were few reports of violence 
following the initial attack.15 
Although governments became involved as the piracy problem 
increased, by protecting ships transiting the Gulf of Aden, there were 
few calls for action to resolve the problem.  That changed with the 
Maersk Alabama incident.  Before long, mass media and political 
players, perhaps thoughtlessly, were equating piracy with terrorism.16  
                                                          
 11. Piracy Figures, supra note 1. 
 12. See, e.g., Flintoff, supra note 9 (noting that some pirates consider America and 
American ships their “No. 1 enemy”). 
 13. The Article will sometimes make reference to incidents of piracy off the coast 
of Somalia as examples in order to provide a pertinent real-world application of the 
analysis used herein.  See supra text accompanying note 1 (listing 406 incidents of 
piracy that occurred in 2009, 217 of which were attributed to Somali pirates).  Such 
analysis can be applied to pirate hijackings in other areas of the world. 
 14. See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman, Somali Pirates Said to Be Near Arms Cargo Deal, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/09/world/africa/09pirates.html; Sharon 
Otterman, Pirates Said to Ask for $25 Million Ransom, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/21/world/africa/21pirates.html. 
 15. This matter of course does not always hold true.  After hijackers of the Greek-
owned vessel Maran Centaurus received what is to be believed as the largest ransom 
ever delivered, in the amount of approximately $6,000,000, a fight between pirate 
factions over the funds reportedly led to the deaths of two pirates.  Nigel Lowry, 
Hijackers Hit Jackpot with Record $6m Ransom Win, LLOYD’S LIST, Jan. 19, 2010, at 1; see 
also Abdi Guled & Abdi Sheikh, Somali Pirates Free Oil Tanker for Record Ransom, 
REUTERS, Jan. 18, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60H3WB20100118 
(reporting that four pirates died in the incident and that the amount was between 
$5.5 million and $7 million). 
 16. See, e.g., Joshua London, Commentary, Somalia’s Muslim Jihad at Sea, WASH. 
TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, at A19 (criticizing the government’s refusal to treat pirates as 
terrorists); Cal Thomas, Terror on the Seas, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 18, 2009, at A21 
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This concept had particular significance for companies, like the 
owner of the Biscaglia, that have a presence in the United States.  The 
pirates are kidnappers, and as the legal analysis in this Article 
indicates, for now at least, ransom payments by U.S. entities to pirates 
not blocked on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (“OFAC”) list 
of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (the “SDN 
List”) are unlikely to result in any kind of sanction—civil or 
criminal—to the payer of the ransom.  As discussed below, this 
analysis will change if the government eventually deems pirates to be 
terrorists or promulgates further regulations to that effect pursuant 
to Executive Order 13536 issued by President Barack Obama dated 
April 12, 2010 (the “Executive Order”), issued just before the 
publication of this Article.17 
The development of a secured transit corridor through the Gulf of 
Aden reduced pirate activity there, but pirates have responded by 
expanding the range of their attacks.18  At the end of November, 
2009, the Joint War Committee of Lloyd’s extended the war-risk zone 
in the region.19  International forces now need to cover not only the 
Gulf of Aden, but also the Somali Basin, with attacks taking place as 
far as one thousand miles off the Somali coast in an area covering 1.5 
million square miles of ocean.20  As one commentator has described:  
“[A] transit system, as in operation in the Gulf of Aden, cannot be 
applied to the Indian Ocean.  Some 35,000 ships cross the Somali 
Basin annually operating on a complex set of trade routes, as 
compared with the two-way system through the Gulf of Aden.”21 
Accordingly, with no overall strategic resolution, military or 
otherwise, to the increasingly serious problem of piracy, the only 
practical way that shipowners can save the lives of their crew members 
is to pay a ransom.  And, if payment of ransoms is made illegal while 
                                                          
(comparing pirates to Islamic terrorists and arguing that they should be dealt with in 
the context of the larger operation against terrorists). 
 17. Exec. Order No. 13,536, 75 Fed. Reg. 19,869 (Apr. 15, 2010) [hereinafter 
Executive Order]. 
 18. See Adam Corbett, Navies ‘Overstretched’ in Piracy Fight, TRADE WINDS, Dec. 18, 
2009, at 54, available at http://www.tradewinds.no/weekly/w2009-12-
18/articles550192.ece?service=printArticle (noting that as sites of pirate attacks 
widen, the naval presence in the Gulf of Aden and around Africa has thinned to the 
point where it may take up to two days for a vessel to reach the site of an attack). 
 19. See Adam Corbett, Pirates Target Tanker Corridor, TRADE WINDS, Dec. 4, 2009, at 
46, available at  
http://www.tradewinds.no/weekly/w20091204/article549327.ece?service=printArticl  
(providing the latitude and longitude of the extended boundaries). 
 20. See Navies ‘Overstretched’ in Piracy Fight, supra note 18 at 54 (discussing the 
difficulty of reaching attacked vessels due to the ever-widening area of such 
occurrences). 
 21. Id. 
RUTKOWSKI.OFFTOPRINTER.CORREX.THIRD (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2010  8:06 PM 
1430 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1425 
the overall problem of piracy is still unsolved, shipowners will be 
placed in an untenable position. 
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A December, 2008, report by the United Nations Monitoring 
Group on Somalia, which oversees an arms embargo on militias in 
that country, described how a typical ransom payment is distributed 
once it is paid:  thirty percent is split equally among the maritime 
militia that seizes the vessel (exceptions being that the first pirate to 
board is given a double take of proceeds and a fine is imposed on 
pirates that fight other pirates), ten percent goes to the ground 
militia guarding the vessel while it is anchored offshore, ten percent 
is distributed to the local community, and the remaining fifty percent 
goes to Somali investors, who are said to sponsor and finance the 
attacks.22 
In most instances, federal law cannot be construed to prohibit an 
entity, be it a vessel owner or its insurers, from making a ransom 
payment to pirates to secure the release of a hijacked vessel and its 
crew.  This Article explores whether there could be any violation of 
U.S. federal law in the event that a vessel owner and its insurers pay a 
ransom to pirates such as those that operate off the coast of Somalia.  
At least three important sources of federal law and regulation must 
be considered:  the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”),23 
executive orders, and the regulations promulgated by OFAC.24  
Additionally, examination of the legality of ransom payments to 
pirates raises the question of whether such payments implicate 
violations of other federal laws that prohibit either the funding of 
terrorist groups or money laundering.  The following Sections 
explore how the various laws affecting the payments of ransom would 
apply to both domestic and foreign companies. 
A critical consideration is that ransom payments must not go to any 
person, organization, or foreign government on OFAC’s SDN List.25  
The SDN List is a lengthy and growing document that includes a 
number of Somali citizens and other individuals residing in Somalia 
                                                          
 22. U.N. Sec. Council, Sec. Council Comm. Established Pursuant to Resolution 
751 (1992) Concerning Somalia, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1811 (2008), ¶ 140, U.N. Doc. S/2008/769 (Dec. 10, 2008), 
available at http://daccess-dds- 
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/604/73/PDF/N0860473.pdf?OpenElement. 
 23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd–1 to –3 (2006). 
 24. 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.101–500.314 (2009). 
 25. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked 
Persons, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/ (last visited May 
24, 2010) [hereinafter “SDN List”] (as of the date last visited, containing 454 pages). 
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(including those on the Annex to the Executive Order).  The list is 
primarily intended to be used by banks and regulatory agencies, and 
is predominately so used, but it also serves as the default list of those 
persons to whom payments are restricted in any capacity.26 
A. Distinction Between Piracy and Maritime Terrorism 
Both piracy and maritime terrorism exist separately, and it is 
dangerous to equate the two.  They are two separate and distinct 
manifestations of non-state violence at sea.  Commentators have 
distinguished the two occurrences as follows:  Piracy is predicated 
upon pecuniary gain while terrorism is motivated by political goals 
beyond the immediate act of attacking a maritime target; the former 
will eschew attention and aim to sustain their trade while the latter 
will court publicity and inflict as much damage as possible.27 
Kevin Jon Heller, a Senior Lecturer at the University of Auckland 
Faculty of Law in New Zealand, whose areas of expertise include 
international criminal law, notes that while pirates may be enemies of 
all states, that does not make them the same as terrorists: 
The defining feature of terrorism is precisely that it is committed 
not for private ends, but to intimidate a civilian population or to 
influence government policy.  Indeed, over the long and troubled 
history of efforts to create a general definition of terrorism, that is 
perhaps the only aspect of the definition that has never seriously 
been in doubt.28 
Another commentator has described terrorism as “the threat or use 
of physical coercion, primarily against noncombatants, especially 
civilians, to create fear in order to achieve various political 
objectives.”29  In contrast, pirates are involved in the venture purely 
for financial gain and generally have no discernable politics, and they 
can therefore be distinguished from terrorists. 
While speculation and conjecture about an emerging nexus 
between piracy and terrorism complicates the legality of ransom 
payments, as witnessed with the Executive Order, which treats them 
                                                          
 26. See, e.g., Kathryn A. Ruff, Comment, Scared to Donate:  An Examination of the 
Effects of Designating Muslim Charities as Terrorist Organizations on the First Amendment 
Rights of Muslim Donors, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 447, 458 (2005) (discussing the 
statutory framework and operation of the SDN List). 
 27. Adam Young & Mark Valencia, Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast 
Asia:  Rectitude and Utility, 25 CONTEMP. SOUTHEAST ASIA 269, 270–74 (2003). 
 28. Posting of Kevin Jon Heller to Opinio Juris, Why Piracy is Not Terrorism, 
http://opiniojuris.org/2008/12/05/why-piracy-is-not-terrorism/ (Dec. 5, 2008, 
15:53 EDT) (emphasis in original). 
 29. BARD E. O’NEILL, INSURGENCY & TERRORISM:  FROM REVOLUTION TO APOCALYPSE 
33 (2d ed. 2005). 
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together in the context of Somalia, credible evidence to support this 
presumed convergence has yet to emerge.30  It is important to discern 
that the objectives of the two remain entirely distinct.  The business 
of piracy is dependent on a thriving and active global shipping 
industry.  In contrast, terrorists, in the context of the contemporary 
maritime world, would seek the disruption of the global maritime 
trade network to further their political ends.31  As will be seen from 
the analysis in the following Section, this distinction between piracy 
and terrorism is paramount to the conclusion that the payment of 
ransom to pirates not specifically identified on the SDN List does not 
violate U.S. federal law. 
B. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
The fundamental provision of the FCPA that defines outlawed 
conduct is found at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3.  The FCPA expressly 
prohibits any “domestic concern,”32 or its officers, directors, 
employees, or agents, from making payments intended to undermine 
the rule of law in a foreign country.  This gives rise to the question: 
Would the payment of ransom to pirates undermine the rule of law, 
in Somalia for example, and thus run afoul of the FCPA? 
Specifically, the FCPA prohibits: 
[M]ak[ing] use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, 
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or 
offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of 
                                                          
 30. See PETER CHALK, THE MARITIME DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY xiv 
(RAND Corp. 2008), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697.pdf (“The presumed 
convergence between maritime terrorism and piracy remains highly questionable . . . 
.”). 
 31. See id. at 22 (discussing the fears of government officials that maritime 
terrorism would shut down an important port or otherwise disrupt the delicate 
supply chain).  Al-Qaida has developed a strategy for maritime terrorism under the 
direction of Abdel Rahim al-Nashiri.  Id. at 20 n.4.  The strategy involved ramming 
ships with explosives, detonating medium sized vessels in the vicinity of larger ones, 
crashing planes into ships, and commissioning underwater demolition teams.  Id.  
After he was arrested in 2003, he confessed to masterminding the attacks on the USS 
Cole and M/V Limburg.  Id. 
 32. For purposes of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, the term “domestic concern” 
means: 
(A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; 
and (B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, 
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which 
has its principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized 
under the laws of a State of the United States or a territory, possession, or 
commonwealth of the United States. 
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1) (2006). 
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anything of value to—(1) any foreign official . . . (2) any foreign 
political party . . . or (3) any person, while knowing that all or a 
portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given, or 
promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official, to any 
foreign political party or official thereof, or to any candidate for 
foreign political office [for enumerated prohibited purposes].33 
It is important to note that the question of whether the FCPA 
applies would be stopped short if it could not be proven that the 
ransom was paid to a political entity.34  The list of prohibited purposes 
includes: 
(A)(i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his 
official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to 
do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or (iii) 
securing any improper advantage; or (B) inducing such foreign 
official to use his influence with a foreign government or 
instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of 
such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such 
domestic concern in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or 
directing business to, any person.35 
It is clear from the text of the FCPA that Congress intended to 
prevent U.S. entities and public companies trading on the U.S. 
markets from engaging in acts intended to influence the acts or 
decisions of foreign officials, political parties, or government 
entities.36  Nowhere does the statute refer to payments to private 
persons, except in the context of foreign government officials and 
foreign political parties, including officials thereof.  Payment to those 
individuals is prohibited in that context only if such individuals are 
expected to “affect or influence any act or decision of such 
government or instrumentality, in order to assist such issuer in 
obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, 
any person.”37  Given that Somali pirate gangs have generally 
                                                          
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a). 
 34. See, e.g., Bruce Zagaris, Avoiding Criminal Liability in the Conduct of International 
Business, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 749, 757 n.36 (1996) (clarifying that the FCPA 
only applies to political entities and does not prohibit the bribing of foreign private 
individuals to gain non-political business advantages). 
 35. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a). 
 36.  Provisions of the FCPA apply to “any issuer which has a class of securities 
registered pursuant to [15 U.S.C. § 78l] or which is required to file reports under [15 
U.S.C. § 78o(d)], or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer or 
any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such issuer.”  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).  The 
term “issuer” means any person who issues or proposes to issue any security subject to 
certain exclusions.  15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8).  Similar to the jurisdiction of federal 
securities laws, the relevant provisions of the FCPA should apply to foreign 
companies publicly trading in the U.S. markets. 
 37. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1)(B). 
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consisted solely of freelancers or tribal groups and clans operating 
wholly outside the laws of Somalia or any other nation, ransom 
payments do not appear to be intended to influence or undermine 
any government’s actions or policies.  Therefore, the FCPA would not 
apply to ransom payments to pirates.  The fact is that the rule of law 
in Somalia, to the extent there is any, is not impacted by ransom 
payments. 
C. Office of Foreign Assets Control Regulations 
OFAC administers a series of regulations (the “OFAC 
Regulations”) that impose economic sanctions against hostile targets 
to further U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.38  
OFAC is also responsible for promulgating, developing, and 
administering for the U.S. Department of the Treasury economic 
sanctions under several federal statutes regarding embargoes.39  A 
close reading of the OFAC Regulations makes it evident that the 
sanctions target certain foreign governments, political parties, 
terrorist groups, and enumerated individuals.  All U.S. banking 
regulatory agencies cooperate in ensuring financial institutional 
compliance with the OFAC Regulations.  This is widely seen as the 
basis from which the United States would be able to regulate the 
payment of ransom to pirates.40 
Due to an explosion of maritime attachment litigation in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in 
2008,41 it became common knowledge in the shipping industry that 
wire transfers made in U.S. dollars will pass through a clearing house 
system made up of a number of intermediary money center banks, 
most of which are located in New York City.42  If a wire transfer 
                                                          
 38. 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.101–500.314 (2009). 
 39. See Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of Treasury, 
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2010). 
 40. See, e.g., Jonathan Spencer, Hull Insurance and General Average—Some Current 
Issues, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1227, 1266–67 (2009) (recognizing the OFAC regulations and 
SDN list as the “critical step” in ensuring the legality of ransom payments). 
 41. Previously, electronic funds transfers were subject to attachment in New York 
under Winter Storm Shipping, Ltd. v. TPI.  310 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2002).  On October 
16, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explicitly 
overruled Winter Storm, ruling that electronic funds transfers that are in transit 
located with an intermediary bank are not property of the defendant that is subject 
to attachment pursuant to Rule B.  See Shipping Corp. of India, Ltd. v. Jaldhi 
Overseas Pte, Ltd., 585 F.3d 58, 67–71 (2d Cir. 2009) cert. denied 78 U.S.L.W. 3447 
(U.S. Mar. 22, 2010).  Since then, the number of maritime attachment cases has 
fallen off and many existing attachments have been vacated. 
 42. See, e.g., Ian F. Taylor, Comment, Maritime Madness:  Rule B, Electronic Funds 
Transfers, Maritime Contracts, and the Explosion of Admiralty Litigation in the Southern 
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payment is to be sent directly or indirectly to the legal or beneficial 
ownership of a recipient on the SDN List, then the payment would be 
blocked in transit while passing through the clearing house system.  
Banks utilize government-mandated OFAC filters to seize these funds 
and they used the same filters in maritime attachment cases before 
electronic funds transfers (“EFTs”) were judged not to be attachable 
property for such purposes.43 
As of the date this Article went to print, there are no specific OFAC 
Regulations that address the issue of ransom payments to kidnappers 
or pirates operating off the coast of Somalia.44  Similarly, Somalia 
currently is not one of the nations whose government is targeted by 
U.S. sanctions or the OFAC Regulations, with only certain specified 
individuals being blocked.45 
At the time of this Article’s writing, there is legitimate concern 
that, through a U.S. Department of State initiative, OFAC will use 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 184446—one of several resolutions 
dealing with Somalia—and the Executive Order discussed below to 
enforce financial sanctions against the payment of ransom in 
Somalia, or that it will otherwise amend legislation to make the 
payment of ransom illegal.47  Resolution 1844 reaffirms previous 
resolutions with respect to Somalia by condemning all acts of 
violence within the country and incitement of violence therein, and 
by expressing concern about all acts intended to prevent or block a 
peaceful political process.48  Although it expresses concern over 
piracy and armed robbery at sea in the region, it grants great 
deference to the Committee formed by U.N. Resolution 751 in the 
determination of individuals and entities to which the sanctions shall 
                                                          
District of New York, 34 TUL. MAR. L.J. 211, 217 (2009) (detailing the operation of the 
EFT clearing house system in New York). 
 43. The court in Jaldhi Overseas ruled, with the consent of all the judges in the 
Southern District of New York, to overturn the court’s prior holding in Winter Storm, 
which created the precedent that EFTs are attachable property.  Jaldhi Overseas, 585 
F.3d 58, 67–71; Winter Storm, 310 F.3d 263. 
 44. The Authors of this Article rely on information provided in the CFR and on 
OFAC’s website as of the date this Article was sent to publication. 
 45. Countries currently targeted include the Balkans, Belarus, Burma, the Ivory 
Coast, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Lebanon, North 
Korea, Sudan, Syria, and Zimbabwe.  OFAC Sanctions Program Summaries, 
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/ (last visited Apr. 27, 
2010). 
 46. S.C. Res. 1844, ¶¶ 3, 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1844 (Nov. 20, 2008). 
 47. See Keith Wallis, Hong Kong Owners Sound Alarm Over Talk of US Ban on 
Ransoms, LLOYD’S LIST, Feb. 22, 2010, at 4 (anticipating that a proposal to make 
payment of ransoms illegal will be met with a strong backlash); see also Adam Corbett, 
Worries Over US Plan on Ransoms, TRADEWINDS, Feb. 19, 2010 (discussing the negative 
implications pf banning the payment of ransom in Somalia). 
 48. S.C. Res. 1844, supra note 46, at ¶ 6. 
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apply.49  The U.N. Security Council recently issued Resolution 991350 
which calls on all states to criminalize piracy under national laws.  As 
the United States already criminalizes piracy under various federal 
antipiracy statutes,51 Resolution 9913 is unlikely to have much effect 
on U.S. law, but it nonetheless serves as further evidence of the 
growing attention to piracy in the region. 
D. Executive Order Issued by the White House 
Effective as of April 13, 2010,52 the Executive Order specifically 
prohibits “the making of any contribution or provision of funds, 
goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose 
property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this 
order.”53  To the extent that a pirate has been identified as a blocked 
person, this provision prohibits the payment of ransom to that 
person.  However, there should be no retroactive liability if a 
shipowner is currently dealing with an individual or entity that later 
becomes identified. 
The Annex attached to the Executive Order identifies eleven 
individuals and the terrorist organization al-Shabaab as “blocked 
persons,” two of the individuals being self-identified pirates.  To the 
extent that a payment of ransom is being made to a blocked person, 
the payment of that ransom is prohibited by the Executive Order.  
The current list of blocked persons may be expanded at any time by 
the President or by the U.S. Department of the Treasury in 
consultation with the U.S. Department of State.  The Executive Order 
specifically authorizes further regulations54 to be promulgated, and in 
other U.S. sanction programs, the Treasury Department has regularly 
promulgated rules to supplement the SDN List. 
On May 5, 2010, the Treasury Department promulgated Somalia 
Sanctions Regulations55 and stated in the summary that it further 
intends to supplement the regulations in order to, inter alia, provide 
further interpretive guidance, additional licenses, and statements of 
licensing policy.  The Somalia Sanctions Regulations extend the list 
                                                          
 49. Id. at ¶ 8. 
 50. S.C. Res. 9913, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/9913 (Apr. 27, 2010). 
 51. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1651–61 (establishing sentencing guidelines for various 
acts of piracy).   
 52. Executive Order, supra note 17, § 9. 
 53. Id. § 1(d)(i). 
 54. Id. § 5. 
 55. Somalia Sanctions Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 24,394 (May 5, 2010) (to be 
codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 551). 
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of blocked persons to entities owned by the blocked persons listed on 
the Annex of the Executive Order.56 
Several portions of the Somalia Sanctions Regulations are reserved, 
and, consistent with the language in the Executive Order, additional  
supplements of the Somalia Sanctions Regulations may specifically 
address the issue of ransom—a topic that the Executive Order and 
current Somalia Sanctions Regulations do not expressly address.  For 
example, the Executive Order blocks the property of all persons 
listed in the Annex as well as any person determined “to have 
engaged in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, 
or stability of Somalia.”57  Included on this list are leaders of the 
Islamic group al-Shabaab and two, or perhaps three, persons 
considered to have engaged in acts of piracy or attempted acts of 
piracy.58  To what extent the Somalia Sanctions Regulations extend 
this mandate remains to be seen. 
Despite speculation that there would be many names listed, to date 
there are reports on the SDN List of only two affiliates of Somali 
pirates who received ransom payments.59  A U.S. “person” that 
contemplates the payment of ransom to pirates will need to ensure 
that, if he or she obtains any information as to the identity or 
identities of the group who will be the ultimate beneficiaries of the 
ransom payment, none of those recipients are listed on the SDN List.  
Since ransom payments to pirates are generally delivered in cash 
directly to pirates, it is highly unlikely that any wire transfer from a 
shipowner or its insurer will be caught by a bank as payment to a 
blocked person.  The Authors of this Article doubt that the pirates 
will be accepting payments by wire transfer any time soon. 
In accordance with guidance provided by OFAC, all “U.S. persons” 
must comply with OFAC regulations, including:  all U.S. citizens and 
permanent resident aliens regardless of where they are located, all 
persons and entities within the United States, and all U.S. 
corporations and their foreign branches.60  This is the same definition 
that is used in the Executive Order.61  For certain programs, such as 
those regarding Cuba and North Korea, all foreign subsidiaries 
                                                          
 56. Id. at 24,398 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 551.406). 
 57. Executive Order, supra note 17, § 1(a)(ii)(A). 
 58. Executive Order, supra note 17, Annex. 
 59. SDN List, supra note 25; Executive Order, supra note 17, Annex.  Two persons 
on the Annex are considered to be known affiliates of Somali pirates. 
 60. OFAC, U.S. Department of the Treasury Frequently Asked Questions and 
Answers, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/faq/answer.shtml#10 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2010). 
 61. Executive Order, supra note 17, § 3(c). 
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owned or controlled by U.S. companies also must comply.62  Certain 
programs further require foreign persons in possession of U.S. origin 
goods to comply.63  Unlike the FCPA, the OFAC Regulations do not 
normally apply to a foreign company where the activities in question 
have no relation to the United States; however, the level of contacts 
with the United States must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. 
E. Federal Statutes Prohibiting the Financing of Terrorism 
The relevant restrictions on financing terrorism are contained in 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”).64  One provision in the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, 
specifically prohibits those subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States from conducting activities that would result in providing 
material support or resources to a formally designated foreign 
“terrorist organization.”65  The list of groups is designated by the U.S. 
Secretary of State and is sometimes referred to as the “FTO List.”66  A 
payor should ensure that a recipient of a ransom payment is not on 
the FTO List.  To violate § 2339B, “a person must have knowledge that 
the organization is a designated terrorist organization . . . that the 
organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity . . . or that 
the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism.”67 
The other pertinent AEDPA provision is 18 U.S.C. § 2339C, as it 
specifically deals with the prohibitions against financing terrorism.  It 
explicitly prohibits a party from 
provid[ing] or collect[ing] funds with the intention that such 
funds be used, or with the knowledge such funds [will] be used . . . to 
carry out—(A) an act which constitutes an offense within the scope 
of a treaty specified in subsection (e)(7), as implemented by the 
                                                          
 62. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201, 515.329 (2009). 
 63. See United States Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, 
Frequently Asked Questions and Answers,   
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/faq/answer.shtml (last visited 
May 24, 2010) (detailing who must comply with OFAC regulations). 
 64. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in part at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–
2339D (2006)). 
 65. For purposes of AEDPA, the term “terrorist organization” means “an 
organization designated as a terrorist organization under section 219 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. § 1189].“  18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(6). 
 66. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Jan. 19, 2010, 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (describing in detail the State 
Department’s designation process for Foreign Terrorist Organizations and providing 
the current list of such organizations which includes forty-five formally designated 
foreign terrorist organizations). 
 67. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (emphasis added).  As used in this context, the term 
“terrorist activity” is defined within § 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, while the term “terrorism” is defined within § 140(d)(2) of the 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989.  Id. 
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United States, or (B) any other act intended to cause death or 
serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking 
an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, 
when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to 
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.68 
It is apparent from the statute’s legislative history that Congress 
viewed this provision as one intended to prevent financing of terrorist 
organizations.69 
In Weiss v. National Westminster Bank PLC,70 the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York interpreted § 
2339C in a case that involved an English bank that was sued by Israeli 
victims of a terrorist act conducted by Hamas.71  The plaintiffs argued 
that the bank was liable under the statute’s civil liability provisions 
because it knew that one of its customers, an Islamic charity with 
known ties to Hamas, was a conduit for funneling funds to the 
terrorist organization.72  The district court held that the bank was 
potentially liable under § 2339C because it could reasonably be 
inferred that the bank was sufficiently aware of its customer’s links to 
Hamas to know that the funding would be used to support terrorist 
activities.73  The district court clearly based its decision on the fact 
that Hamas is a known and designated terrorist organization and that 
the Islamic charity’s ties to Hamas should have been known by the 
bank based on “know your customer” requirements.74 
The broad language in § 2339C raises concerns that the statute 
could be interpreted as prohibiting the payment of ransoms to 
pirates engaged in activities that violate the scope of the various 
treaties, particularly the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
                                                          
 68. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 69. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 107-307, at 6–7 (2001), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
521, 521–22 (denoting the federal government’s willingness to bind itself to 
prosecute or extradite those who fund terrorism). 
 70. 453 F. Supp. 2d 609 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 71. Id. at 612.  Hamas is a formally designated terrorist organization on the FTO 
List.  Id. at 616. 
 72. See id. at 612 (explaining that victims of the attacks sought civil liability and 
damages under 18 U.S.C §§ 2333(a), 2339B, and 2339C). 
 73. Id. at 630. 
 74. See id. (reiterating that the bank was required to investigate their customers, 
as well as any organization that transferred to or received funds from those 
customers).  The BSA, which was subsequently amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, 
now requires banks to conduct rigorous “know your customer” customer 
identification programs.  See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 5318(i), (l) (2006) (announcing 
mandatory customer identification and due diligence requirements that oblige banks 
to scrutinize account holders and report suspicious transactions). 
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Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.75  If the statute were 
enforced in such fashion, it would mean that ransom payments to 
pirates by a U.S. shipping company, insurance company, or foreign 
entity later found to be within the jurisdiction of the United States, 
could be prosecuted under this provision even though the payments 
are not made to any actual terrorists or terrorist organizations.76 
The legislative and case history demonstrates that the statute has 
not yet been read in this manner, as the statute has only been used in 
respect of funding activities involving known and designated terrorist 
organizations.  To date, § 2339C has never been used to prosecute 
corporations or individuals who provided or collected funds to be 
paid as ransom.  The U.S. district courts—which would have 
jurisdiction—have not utilized this statutory provision to prosecute 
the payment of ransoms to pirate gangs.  Moreover, there has been 
no announcement by the Executive Branch that it would seek to 
prosecute pirates as terrorists under the AEDPA.  Although federal 
authorities have restricted enforcement of § 2339C to cases involving 
terrorist acts, if federal authorities decide to treat pirates as terrorists, 
paying a ransom to pirates could readily be construed as a violation of 
§ 2339C. 
Further, under 18 U.S.C. § 2333, with respect to a civil claim, 
[a]ny national of the United States injured in his or her person, 
property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, 
or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any 
appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover 
threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, 
including attorney’s fees.77 
The term “international terrorism” is explicitly defined in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2331(1).  That definition includes, inter alia, an element with 
respect to the purpose of the prohibited activity.78  Accordingly, to be 
“international terrorism” within the meaning of the statute, the 
prohibited activity must “be intended—(i) to intimidate or coerce a 
                                                          
 75. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1)(A) (expressing in expansive terms the offense 
prohibiting the financing of terrorism).  The main purpose of the Convention is “to 
ensure that appropriate action is taken against persons committing unlawful acts 
against ships . . . includ[ing] the seizure of ships by force; acts of violence against 
persons on board ships; and the placing of devices on board a ship which are likely 
to destroy or damage it.”  INT’L MARITIME ORG., CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF 
UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST THE SAFETY OF MARITIME NAVIGATION, 1988, at 1, 
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=259&doc_id=686. 
 76. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1)(A). 
 77. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). 
 78. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331(1)(B)(i)–(iii) (requiring that before an activity may be 
deemed international terrorism, it must appear to be aimed at intimidating a 
population or government or affecting the conduct of a government). 
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civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a 
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”79  
Thus, by its own terms, the statute does not apply to activity intended 
solely for one’s private or personal pecuniary gain.  In contrast, 
private or personal gain is a required element to the crime of piracy 
under the various U.S. federal antipiracy statutes.80 
The current interpretation of AEDPA militates against 
prosecutions of companies for paying ransoms to Somali pirates.  If 
that interpretation were to change, foreign corporations may also 
enjoy other jurisdictional protections.  The question of whether 
AEDPA applies to a foreign shipowner or insurance company will 
hinge on whether there are sufficient contacts to find personal 
jurisdiction. 
In two recent AEDPA cases, courts reached different results on this 
question.  In In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001,81 the Second 
Circuit held that four Saudi Arabian princes and a Saudi banker, who 
had each donated to a Muslim charity alleged to have funded the 
terrorist organization al-Qaida, did not have sufficiently systematic 
and continuous minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction 
under state and federal laws.82  In Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian 
Authority,83 another case brought under 18 U.S.C. § 2338, the 
Palestinian Authority (“PA”) and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (“PLO”) were found to have sufficient minimum 
contacts with the United States to justify the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction by a district court.  The PLO maintained an office in 
Washington, D.C. headed by the chief representatives of both groups, 
employed nine staff members, and spent more than $200,000 in six 
months on activities conducted in the United States.84  Additionally, 
the court considered that the PLO maintained an Observer Mission 
to the United Nations in New York that engaged in fundraising 
                                                          
 79. Id. 
 80. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1651–61 (outlining elements of piracy and forbidding, 
generally, the plundering of money or property of any vessel belonging to another); 
see also United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 163 (1820) (affirming the 
piracy conviction of a seaman who mutinied with his crew and helped hijack another 
vessel that was subsequently used to plunder a third ship at sea).  Furthermore, it 
should be noted that none of these federal antipiracy statutes make any mention of 
the payment of ransoms. 
 81. 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (June 29, 2009). 
 82. Id. at 95–96 (holding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that these 
individuals had “‘expressly aimed’ intentional tortious acts at residents of the United 
States”). 
 83. 153 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.R.I. 2001). 
 84. Id. at 88. 
RUTKOWSKI.OFFTOPRINTER.CORREX.THIRD (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2010  8:06 PM 
1442 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1425 
activities and speaking engagements, the PA employed a lobbying 
firm in the United States, and both groups maintained several bank 
accounts in New York.85  Based on the holdings of these two cases, the 
applicability of the statute to a foreign-based shipowner will depend 
on its contacts in the United States, including those in connection 
with the payment of the ransom. 
F. Federal Anti-Money Laundering Laws 
The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (“MLCA”)86 is the 
statute that formally defines money laundering as a federal crime.  
The elements that constitute a violation of the MLCA are as follows: 
(1) the defendant conducted a financial transaction; (2) the financial 
transaction involved the use of “proceeds of specified unlawful 
activity;” (3) the defendant knew the property involved in the 
transaction were “proceeds of some form of unlawful activity;” and 
(4) the defendant knew such transaction was “designed . . . to conceal 
or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the 
control of the proceeds.”87  A “specified unlawful activity” is defined 
in § 1956(c) and includes such offenses as violence against maritime 
navigation (18 U.S.C. § 2280), kidnapping (18 U.S.C. § 1201), and 
hostage taking (18 U.S.C. § 1203).88  The courts uniformly hold that 
“proceeds” are “funds obtained from [some] prior, separate criminal 
activity.”89 
The statute focuses on the source of the funds used rather than how 
they are likely to be used.  If ransom funds are to be derived from a 
vessel owner’s own assets, insurance proceeds, or a loan from a 
legitimate bank, then such ransom payment is almost certainly not 
derived from one of the specified unlawful activities listed in § 
1956(c).  Consequently, it is doubtful that any federal prosecutor 
could prove a violation of the second and third elements of the 
MLCA, which require the funds to be known to be from a “specified 
unlawful activity.”  Moreover, the fourth element would be difficult to 
prove because the purpose of any such ransom payment would not be 
a financial transaction intended to conceal or disguise the source or 
                                                          
 85. Id. 
 86. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–57 (2006). 
 87. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1); see United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1526 (2d 
Cir. 1997) (dissecting the elements of the MLCA, in regards to a narcotics trafficking 
charge, to find the statute requires both that a defendant generally knew the 
proceeds from the transaction were derived from criminal activity and that they were 
to be used to cover up this activity). 
 88. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7). 
 89. United States v. Savage, 67 F.3d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 1995), partially abrogated 
on other grounds by United States v. Van Alstyne, 584 F.3d 803, 813 (9th Cir. 2009). 
RUTKOWSKI.OFFTOPRINTER.CORREX.THIRD (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2010  8:06 PM 
2010] MUGGED TWICE? 1443 
ownership of the proceeds.  Given the court decisions cited above 
and the text of the MLCA, it is evident that payment of a ransom to 
the pirates would not in itself constitute a violation of the MLCA. 
The scope of the MLCA has the jurisdictional hooks to apply 
against a foreign company. 
For purposes of adjudicating an action filed or enforcing a penalty 
ordered under [18 U.S.C. § 1956], the district courts shall have 
jurisdiction over any foreign person, including any financial 
institution authorized under the laws of a foreign country, against 
whom the action is brought, if service of process upon the foreign 
person is made under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the 
laws of the country in which the foreign person is found, and—(A) 
the foreign person commits an offense under subsection (a) 
involving a financial transaction that occurs in whole or in part in 
the United States; (B) the foreign person converts, to his or her 
own use, property in which the United States has an ownership 
interest by virtue of the entry of an order of forfeiture by a court of 
the United States; or (C) the foreign person is a financial 
institution that maintains a bank account at a financial institution 
in the United States.90 
18 U.S.C. § 1957 states that  
[w]hoever, in any of the circumstances set forth [below], knowingly 
engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in 
criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000 and is 
derived from specified unlawful activity, shall be punished as 
provided in subsection (b) [of 18 U.S.C. § 1957] . . . .  The 
circumstances referred to . . . are—(1) that the offense under this 
section takes place in the United States or in the special maritime 
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; or (2) that the 
offense under [18 U.S.C. § 1957] takes place outside the United 
States and such special jurisdiction, but the defendant is a United 
States person . . . .91 
Therefore, the MLCA should not apply, under normal cases, to a 
foreign shipowning company. 
G. Bank Secrecy Act 
The principal federal statute detailing the rights and obligations of 
individuals, banks, and financial institutions in the United States to 
assist U.S. government agencies in the detection and prevention of 
                                                          
 90. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b)(2). 
 91. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957(a), (d). 
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money laundering is the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (“BSA”),92 which is 
administered by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(“FinCEN”) at the Treasury Department.  The BSA provides extensive 
guidance for the filing of various required reports for certain kinds of 
transactions.  Since Congress passed the BSA, several other federal 
statutes have been enacted to enhance and amend its provisions.93  A 
review of the text of these statutes (contained in the FinCEN index) 
reveals that their primary focus is on establishing the fundamental 
requirements for record-keeping and reporting by private individuals, 
banks, and financial institutions to aid the U.S. government in 
identifying transfers of U.S. currency and money instruments into or 
out of the United States. 
The BSA requires that transfers of U.S. “monetary instruments” be 
reported.94  The most pertinent section of the BSA imposes reporting 
requirements on any “person or an agent or bailee of the person . . . 
[who knowingly transfers] monetary instruments of more than 
$10,000 at one time [] from a place in the United States to or 
through a place outside the United States . . . .”95  Such reports are to 
be filed at a time and place determined by the Secretary of the 
Treasury.96  The statute further forbids failing—or causing another 
person to fail—to file a report required under § 5316.97  Failure to 
report such transfers may lead to civil or criminal forfeiture of the 
property to the United States government.98 
The applicable regulations relating to the BSA (“BSA Regulations”) 
are contained in 12 C.F.R § 21 and 31 C.F.R. § 103.  The BSA 
Regulations are intended to apply to banks, mutual funds, insurance 
                                                          
 92. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, 1114–24 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of Titles 12, 15, and 31 of the United States Code). 
 93. See FinCEN, Bank Secrecy Act, http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/bsa/ 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2010) (detailing the range of money laundering provisions that 
have been enacted to amend the BSA).  FinCEN’s website provides a complete index 
of all the federal anti-money laundering and financial reporting statutes passed since 
1970.  See id. 
 94. Within the BSA, “monetary instruments” means— 
(A) United States coins and currency; (B) as the Secretary may prescribe by 
regulation, coins and currency of a foreign country, travelers’ checks, bearer 
negotiable instruments, bearer investment securities, bearer securities, stock 
on which title is passed on delivery, and similar material; and (C) as the 
Secretary of the Treasury shall provide by regulation for purposes of [31 
U.S.C.] sections 5316 and 5331, checks, drafts, notes, money orders, and 
other similar instruments which are drawn on or by a foreign financial 
institution and are not in bearer form. 
31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(3). 
 95. 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A). 
 96. 31 U.S.C. § 5316(b). 
 97. 31 U.S.C. § 5324(c)(1). 
 98. 31 U.S.C. § 5317(d). 
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companies, stock and commodities brokers, and other financial 
service providers so that such financial intermediaries do not hide the 
transfer or deposit of money derived from criminal activity.99  
Additionally, the BSA and the regulations promulgated thereunder 
apply for the most part only to domestic financial agencies and 
domestic financial institutions that perform the reporting.100  Thus, 
these parts of the BSA Regulations should not apply to a shipowner 
because the shipowner is not a financial agency or institution.  While 
one would need to closely inspect each provision separately, two of 
the BSA Regulations merit further analysis. 
BSA Regulation 31 C.F.R. § 103.16 requires an insurance company 
within the United States involved as a business in the issuing or 
underwriting of any “covered product”101 to file a Suspicious Activity 
Report by Insurance Companies (“SAR-IC”) if an insurance payout 
transaction is 
conducted or attempted by, at, or through an insurance company, 
and involves or aggregates at least $5,000 in funds or other assets, 
and the insurance company knows, suspects, or has reason to 
suspect that the transaction (or a pattern of transactions of which 
the transaction is a part) . . . (iv) Involves use of the insurance 
company to facilitate criminal activity.102 
Under a very broad reading of the word “facilitate,” a payment by a 
U.S. underwriter to pirates may require the filing of SAR-IC by the 
insurance company for the payout of an underwritten covered 
product.  However, FinCEN provided guidance in FIN-2008-G004, 
issued on March 20, 2008, stating that a contract of indemnity would 
not be considered a covered product.103  FinCEN further stated that 
such an insurance policy, which could provide kidnap and ransom 
coverage, would otherwise not be considered a covered product—
even if a direct payout were made by the insurer—because the policy 
lacks a cash value or an investment feature, which means that it poses 
less risk of being utilized for money laundering.104 
                                                          
 99. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.15–103.22 (listing the suspicious transaction reporting 
requirements for various financial institutions). 
 100. 31 U.S.C. § 5312 (b)(1). 
 101. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.16(a)(4) (defining a “covered product” as a permanent 
life insurance policy, an annuity contract, or “other insurance product with features 
of cash value or investment”). 
 102. 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.16(b)(2), (2)(iv) (2009). 
 103. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, GUIDANCE 
FIN-2008-G004 3 (2008), http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/fin-
2008-g004.pdf (clarifying that several products, including contracts of indemnity, are 
not considered “covered products” because they are less likely to be used for money 
laundering purposes). 
 104. As described by FinCEN: 
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BSA Regulation 31 C.F.R. § 103.23 mandates that all individuals or 
organizations make a report of the transportation of more than 
$10,000 anytime they physically transport monetary instruments from 
a place in the United States to or through a place outside the United 
States.105  That regulation states that “[a] person is deemed to have 
caused such transportation . . . when he aids, abets, counsels, 
commands, procures, or requests it to be done by a financial 
institution or any other person.”106  For this reason, a payer of a 
ransom to pirates will clearly need to ensure that if U.S. currency is 
transported from the United States to the designated payoff spot, a 
report of the transfer is filed.  If funds originating outside the United 
States are used for ransom payments, federal anti-money-laundering 
laws are generally not implicated. 
CONCLUSION 
If ransom payments were known to be made to terrorists or used to 
fund terrorist activities, then such payments are likely to be illegal 
and would likely be prosecuted.  However, in early February, 2009, 
Rear Admiral Ted Branch, Director of Information, Plans, and 
Security at the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, testified at a 
Congressional hearing on piracy, stating that “agencies had been 
looking for a link between terrorism and the piracy taking place off 
the Somali Coast but had not detected any.”107  This statement 
supports the conclusion that the payment of ransom to pirates, who 
                                                          
The definition [of covered product] incorporates a functional approach, 
and encompasses any insurance product having the same kinds of features 
that make permanent life insurance and annuity products more at risk of 
being used for money laundering, e.g., having a cash value or investment 
feature.  To the extent that . . . other kinds of insurance do not exhibit these 
features, they are not products covered by the rule. 
See id. at 3. 
 105. 31 C.F.R. § 103.23(a).  Note, however, that the required reporting is subject 
to several exceptions, which are set forth in § 103.23(c). 
 106. Id. 
 107. JORGE ROMERO ET AL., THE PIRATES OF PUNTLAND:  PRACTICAL, LEGAL AND 
POLICY ISSUES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST SOMALI PIRACY 6 (K&L Gates 2009).  In contrast, 
in March, 2009, Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General, reported: 
[G]overnment officials in the northeastern Somali region of Puntland as well 
as those in the ‘Transitional Federal Government’ [] of Somalia are 
complicit in piracy and the fairly clear indications that al-Shabaab, an 
al-Qaeda-linked Somali group that was formally designated a ‘foreign 
terrorist organization’ last year by the U.S. Department of State, is getting at 
least a part of the ransom proceeds in exchange for allowing the pirates to 
operate in areas it controls . . . . 
J. Peter Pham, Strategic Interests:  Pondering Somali Piracy, WORLD DEF. REV., Apr. 23, 
2009, http://worlddefensereview.com/pham042309.shtml. 
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are not terrorists, is allowable in most circumstances under the laws 
of the United States. 
As discussed in the Introduction of this Article, however, following 
the taking of the Maersk Alabama in the spring of 2009, officials in the 
federal government, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 
made comments about how Somali pirates could potentially be 
treated as terrorists and made subject to monetary sanctions.108  This 
call has since grown into rumors of possible legislative or regulatory 
action to make ransom payments illegal, either specifically in Somalia 
or as a more blanket policy.  This speculation, if realized, would have 
the unfortunate consequence of making the United States treat 
ransom payments by a shipowner, manager, or insurance company 
that is trying to save the lives of the ship operator’s crew as criminal 
activity. 
As of now, paying the ransoms is the only dependable way a 
shipowner has to ensure the safe release of its crew.  There is a fear 
that the successes of piracy have helped fuel the practice.  The 
average ransom settlement has gradually increased over the past year, 
and it is expected that the average ransom settlement may reach 
$3,000,000 during 2010.109 
If ransom payments are made illegal, if pirates are deemed to be 
terrorists, or if the number of persons blocked pursuant to the 
Executive Order is expanded to include most known pirate 
associates, shipowners will be placed in an untenable position:  they 
must either pay a ransom to ensure the safety of their crews and 
consequently face a risk of prosecution for violating U.S. law, or 
refuse payment and risk the lives of their crew.110  Fortunately, this is 
                                                          
 108. See John Whitesides, Clinton Calls for Expanded Global Response to Piracy, 
REUTERS, Apr. 15, 2009, 
 http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE53E5ZU20090415 (“[Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton] said the United States also would step up efforts to track and 
freeze the monetary assets of the pirates, just as it does with drug traffickers and 
terrorist groups.”). 
 109. See John Drake, Ships Face Greater Attack Risk in Indian Ocean, LLOYD’S LIST, 
Feb. 19, 2010, at 13 (speculating that the average ransom payment could soon reach 
three million dollars in light of the fact that the average payment not only reached a 
record high in 2009 but has continued to swell since that time). 
 110. Other countries have already taken note of this problem.  For example, 
“H[ong] Kong shipowners have written to the Chinese government warning of the 
possible consequences if the U.S. goes ahead with plans to make ransom payments to 
pirates illegal.”  See Wallis, supra note 47 (discussing the likelihood of a strong 
backlash if the payment of ransoms are made illegal).  The UK High Court of Justice 
recently ruled that the payment of ransom for the safe release of vessel and crew 
should not be categorized as contrary to public policy.  See Masefield AG v. Amlin 
Corporate Member Ltd. [2010] EWHC (Comm) 280, ¶ 95 [Eng.] (rejecting an 
argument advanced by an insurer of cargo that was held for ransom that payment of 
said ransom should be deemed to be against public policy). 
RUTKOWSKI.OFFTOPRINTER.CORREX.THIRD (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2010  8:06 PM 
1448 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1425 
not the current state of affairs, but there is a possibility that the 
current state of affairs may soon change from discouraging ransom 
payments to prohibiting them.  While payment of ransom may foster 
piracy, criminalizing the victim cannot be the answer. 
As the current state of affairs exists, there are limits to what a vessel 
owner or its insurers might know about the identity of the pirates or 
the intended purposes or final recipient of ransom proceeds.  The 
FCPA will generally not be implicated by the payment of ransom to 
pirates, and so long as an entity does not know that the proceeds of 
any ransom paid do not go directly to any person on the SDN List or 
FTO List, it should avoid liability for violation of the OFAC 
Regulations and the federal laws prohibiting support of terrorism.111  
Lastly, a U.S. entity should be aware that the payment of ransom is 
not a violation of the federal anti-money-laundering statutes in and of 
itself, but that the payment must comply with federal reporting 
requirements with respect to the transfer of U.S. currency.  If the 
United States determines that pirates are terrorists, however, it has a 
broad arsenal at its disposal to swiftly sanction those who pay ransoms 
to pirates. 
 
                                                          
 111. While some of the laws relating to the payment of ransom may be similarly 
applicable to U.S. and non-U.S. entities, two of the more significant laws and 
regulations, the OFAC Regulations and the MLCA, should not apply to a foreign 
shipowning company without sufficient contacts to the United States. 
